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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions and amend-
ments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Texas Supreme Court held in Essenburg v. Dallas County,' that the
statutory requirement that a plaintiff suing a county must first present her
claim to the county commissioners2 is not jurisdictional, but is instead
merely a notice provision.3 The high court rejected the court of appeals'
attempt to analogize the presentment requirement to an exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement.4 A presentment requirement is in-
tended to promote settlement, noted the court, while an "exhaustion re-
quirement seeks to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the
dispute-the hallmark of a jurisdictional statute."'5
The ripeness doctrine avoids premature adjudication of claims and is a
component of subject matter jurisdiction.6 The supreme court revisited
one of its long-standing precedents in this area during the Survey period.
It held that an insurer's duty to indemnify is justiciable before the under-
lying suit against the insured is concluded if the insurer has no duty to
defend, and the same reasons negating the duty to defend will likewise
negate the duty to indemnify.7 The court noted that the prior rule was
based in part on the inability to predict whether the ultimate amount in
controversy would exceed the then-minimum jurisdictional threshold for
* B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Partner, Figari & Dav-
enport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
port, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.S., University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
port, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 41 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 1399 (Sept. 24, 1998).
2. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.041(a) (Vernon 1986).
3. See Essenburg, 41 TEX. SuP. CT. J. at 1400.
4. See id. at 1399-1400.
5. Id. at 1400.
6. See Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Tex., Inc., 971
S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998).
7. See Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. 1997),
overruling in part, Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1968).
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district courts of five hundred dollars.8 Because the 1985 constitutional
amendments eliminated this jurisdictional minimum,9 there remained no
reason to await adjudication of the indemnification issue in the circum-
stance posited by the court."'
The plaintiffs in Ford Motor Co. v. Cammack," sued under both the
wrongful death and survival statutes. 12 They failed, however, to prove
that they were the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased's es-
tate entitled to bring a survival action. 13 Relying on the supreme court's
holding that a party's right to bring a survival action is a question of
standing, 14 the court of appeals held that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the survival claim, notwithstanding the defend-
ant's failure to specially except or file a verified plea in abatement chal-
lenging the "capacity" in which plaintiffs sued. 15
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The court in World Distributors, Inc. v. Knox, rebuffed plaintiffs' crea-
tive attempt to sidestep their failure to strictly comply with the Texas
long-arm statute 16 by claiming that the Secretary of State's mailing of ci-
tation to the defendant was proper service under Rule 108.17 As grounds
for its decision, the court noted: the plaintiffs' petition did not indicate an
intent to serve under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 108; the Secretary of
State is not authorized by law to serve process; the Secretary of State is
deemed to be an agent of a non-resident corporate defendant and cannot,
therefore, be a "disinterested person" entitled to serve under the rule;
and plaintiffs had not shown strict compliance with the rule in any
event. 18
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) authorizes a trial court to order
substituted service by delivery of the citation and petition to anyone over
sixteen years of age at the defendant's usual place of business or abode or
in any other manner the evidence shows will be reasonably effective to
give the defendant notice. 19 Rivers v. Viskozki 20 stands as a reminder
that, under the second prong of the rule, the trial court must specify the
precise method of alternative service to be utilized. 21 Thus, the court's
8. See Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84.
9. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (conferring jurisdiction over "all actions, proceedings,
and remedies" on district courts).
10. See Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84.
11. No. 14-95-01505-CV, 1998 WL 740901 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 3,
1998, no pet.h.).
12. See id. at *1.
13. See id. at *2-3.
14. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998).
15. See Cammack, 1998 WL 740901, at *2.
16. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041, et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1999).
17. 968 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet. h.)
18. See id. at 478-479.
19. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(b).
20. 967 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet. h.).
21. See id. at 870.
1486 [Vol. 52
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
order in that case, which effectively authorized the constable to deter-
mine a manner of service that would be reasonably effective to give no-
tice to the defendant, was invalid.22
The court in Rajan v. Shepard-Knapp,23 looked to federal law to deter-
mine the efficacy of state court process that was served after removal. 24
The case was remanded, and a default judgment was entered in the state
court against one of the defendants.25 By writ of error, the defendant
argued that the service on him was defective and the default judgment
invalid. 26 The court of appeals disagreed.27 Relying on a federal statute
governing removal procedures,28 and two federal district court opin-
ions,29 the court held that the completion of service on defendant after
removal was permissible. 30 Moreover, the court held that the failure of
the plaintiff to file the return of citation in the federal court, as would
have been required in state court, did not render the service defective
since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not require it.31
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In Dawson-Austin v. Austin,32 the supreme court agreed with all of the
intermediate appellate courts that had considered the issue in holding
that an unverified special appearance can be cured by amendment and
does not constitute a general appearance. 33 The court also rejected an
argument that the defendant's special appearance was waived by her fil-
ing, in the same instrument, a motion to quash service, a plea to the juris-
diction, and a plea in abatement without expressly stating that these latter
motions were "subject to" the special appearance. 34 According to the
court, the principle underlying both of its holdings, and the test for deter-
mining whether a defendant has entered a general appearance, is whether
the defendant's pleading or motion acknowledges the court's jurisdiction
22. See id.
23. 965 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, writ denied).
24. See id. at 49.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 49-50.
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (1994).
29. See Listle v. Milwaukee County, 926 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Protos Shipping, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 979 (N.D.
Il1. 1979).
30. See Rajan, 965 S.W.2d at 49-50. The dissent argued that a federal appeals court
case, Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1967), reaching the opposite conclusion
was the better-reasoned authority. See Rajan, 965 S.W.2d at 50-51 (Mirabel, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 50 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 4(l) ("[flailure to make proof of service does
not affect the validity of service")).
32. 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998).
33. See id. at 322.
34. See id. at 322-23, overruling, Portland Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d




or seeks affirmative relief.35
IV. VENUE
Under former Texas practice, venue was fixed in the county named in a
plea of privilege 36 whenever a plaintiff nonsuited his action before the
trial court made its venue determination. 37 Although the Texas Supreme
Court refused to decide five years ago whether this "venue-fixing" rule
survived the 1983 venue amendments, 38 Geochem Tech. Corp. v. Ver-
seckes39 presented the court with another opportunity to address the is-
sue. The court of appeals in Geochem concluded that a nonsuit under the
current rules of procedure had the same effect as under the former venue
rules, i.e., automatically fixing venue in the county to which transfer was
sought.40 The supreme court disagreed, holding that the effect a nonsuit
has on venue depends on the state of the record at the time the nonsuit is
filed.41 Given the record as it existed when plaintiff nonsuited, the court
determined that venue had not been fixed in the county to which defend-
ants sought transfer.42
The plaintiff in Geochem sued two defendants in Dallas County seek-
ing damages and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to trans-
fer invoking the mandatory venue provision for injunctions. 43 The
defendants sought transfer to two different counties, as one resided in
Stephens County and the other in Van Zandt County. In an amended
motion to transfer venue, however, the Van Zandt County defendant
joined in the other defendant's request that the case be transferred to
Stephens County. In support of the amended motion, this defendant filed
an affidavit stating that he resided in both Stephens and Van Zandt coun-
ties. The plaintiff did not deny these venue facts, but instead nonsuited
the Dallas County action and immediately refiled the case in Van Zandt
35. See Austin, 968 S.W.2d at 322-23. See also Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701,
706-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.h.) (defaulted non-resident defend-
ant's motion for new trial filed subject to his special appearance was not a general appear-
ance, notwithstanding the inclusion of a statement of defendant's readiness to proceed to
trial).
36. Prior to their amendment in 1983, the rules of procedure governing venue hearings
provided for the filing of a "plea of privilege" as the procedural mechanism for challenging
a plaintiff's choice of venue. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89,93, 120a, 385, 527 (1983).
Complementing the Legislature's 1983 overhaul of the Texas venue statutes, Act of June
17, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch 385 § 1, 1983 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2119, 2119-24 (now codified at
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001, et seq. (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1999), the
Texas Supreme Court promulgated amended procedural rules in 1983 that eliminated all
references to the plea of privilege. See Order of June 15, 1983, reprinted in 46 TEX. B. J.
858, 858-859 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Royal Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543, 135 S.W.2d 958, 967
(1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 601 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
38. See Ruiz v. Conoco Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 756-57 (Tex. 1993).
39. 962 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. 1998).
40. 929 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996), rev'd, 962 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1998).
41. 962 S.W.2d at 543.
42. See id. at 544.
43. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.023(a) (Vernon 1986) (suit for in-
junctive relief must be brought in the county of defendant's domicile).
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County against both defendants. Under these circumstances, the
supreme court acknowledged that the mandatory venue facts had been
established at the time of the nonsuit.44 Because an individual may have
more than one residence for venue purposes,45 those facts established
only that venue was proper in either Stephens County (the county to
which defendants sought transfer) or Van Zandt County (the county in
which plaintiff refiled its suit).46 Observing that the venue statutes do not
say that a plaintiff may choose venue only once 4 7 the Geochem court
disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that a plaintiff loses his
right to choose venue when his first choice is a county of improper
venue.
48
In re Continental Airlines, Inc.4 9 also involved the mandatory venue
provision for injunctions. The City of Fort Worth sued the City of Dallas
seeking a judgment declaring its rights under compacts and agreements
between the cities concerning DFW International Airport and Love
Field. When Continental Airlines subsequently announced plans to
schedule passenger service from Love Field to Cleveland, Fort Worth
amended its prayer to seek a specific declaration that these flights would
violate the 1968 contracts between Dallas and Fort Worth. Shortly before
the scheduled flights to Cleveland, Fort Worth sought and obtained tem-
porary injunctive relief against Continental. Before granting the injunc-
tion, the trial court heard and denied the motions to transfer venue filed
by Continental and other defendants. At that point, defendants invoked
the appellate courts' original mandamus jurisdiction to enforce
mandatory venue under section 15.0642 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. 50
As Continental Airlines represented the court's first opinion addressing
section 15.0642,51 the supreme court began by announcing that the stan-
dard of review under this provision is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. 52 The court then held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in refusing to transfer venue because the injunction venue stat-
ute applies only to suits in which the relief sought is purely or primarily
injunctive.53 The temporary injunction Fort Worth sought, on the other
hand, was ancillary inasmuch as the city's pleadings requested only de-
claratory relief and would not have supported a permanent injunction.54
The court brushed aside the defendants' complaint that Fort Worth could
44. See Geochem, 962 S.W.2d at 543.
45. See id. at 543-44 (citing Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407, 241 S.W. 136, 140 (1951)).
46. See Geochem, 962 S.W.2d at 544.
47. See id.
48. See id. The court of appeals had reasoned that "there can be only one first choice"
because "any other posture would be to promote rather than prevent the very type of legal
'gamesmanship' sought to be prevented under the old law." Geochem, 929 S.W.2d at 89.
49. 41 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 1400, 1998 WL 652555 (Sept. 14, 1998).
50. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
51. 1998 WL 652555, at *1.
52. See id. at *2.
53. See id. at *2 (citing Ex parte Coffee, 160 Tex. 224, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (1959)).
54. See Continental Airlines, 1998 WL 652555, at *2.
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later use injunctive remedies to enforce its judgment if and when it ob-
tained the declarations it sought. According to the court, the mere possi-
bility that a defendant will disobey a trial court's final judgment, forcing it
to resort to its injunctive powers as a means of enforcement, does not
transform the suit into an injunction suit under Section 65.023(a). 55
A number of cases decided during the Survey period, all involving
breast implant litigation, addressed issues relating to the joinder provi-
sion of the venue statute. 56 Section 15.003(a) of that statute requires each
plaintiff in a suit to establish proper venue independently of any other
plaintiff.57 Any person who is unable to make the required showing may
not join or maintain the suit as a plaintiff unless, again independently of
any other plaintiff, he establishes that: "(1) joinder or intervention in the
suit is proper under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) maintaining
venue in the county of suit does not unfairly prejudice another party to
the suit; (3) there is an essential need to have the person's claim tried in
the county in which the suit is pending; and (4) the county in which the
suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue [both] for the person seek-
ing to join [as plaintiff]. . . and the persons against whom the suit is
brought. '58 Anyone dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling on interven-
tion or joinder can file an interlocutory appeal, 59 as did the defendants in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Barner.60
In Barner, the defendants filed a motion to transfer venue in which
they questioned the propriety of joinder and specifically denied that the
county of suit was a proper venue as to eight of the nine plaintiffs. Fol-
lowing the trial court's denial of the motion to transfer venue, defendants
filed an interlocutory appeal premised entirely on section 15.003. The
appellees apparently contended that the appellate court was without ju-
risdiction to review the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer
venue due to section 15.064(a).61 Although the court of appeals agreed
that it could not review the venue determination per se, it held that it
could review the decision permitting joinder of all nine plaintiffs, which
presumably was subsumed in the trial court's order denying the motion to
transfer.62
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Abel v.
Surgitek.63 Citing Barner and two other cases decided during the Survey
55. See id. at *4; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.023(a) (Vernon 1986) (suit
for injunctive relief shall be brought in county of domicile).
56. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
57. Id. at § 15.003(a).
58. Id. at § 15.003(a)(1)-(4).
59. See id. at § 15.003(3)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (providing for an interlocutory ap-
peal on an accelerated basis).
60. 964 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
61. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986) (provides that
"[n]o interlocutory appeal shall lie from the [venue] determination.").
62. See Barner, 964 S.W.2d at 301.
63. 975 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. granted). Editor's note: The
Texas Supreme Court has recently issued an opinion, as yet unreleased, which reverses the
court of appeals' decision. See Surgitek v. Abel, No. 98-0592, 1999 WL 450864 (Tex.).
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period,64 the court held that an interlocutory appeal is available from a
trial court's venue decision whenever that decision rests on whether a
person properly established joinder under section 15.003(a). 65 "To hold
otherwise", said the court, "would enable a defendant to defeat a plain-
tiff's right to interlocutory appeal by the label given to his motion." 66
The court in Surgitek also opined as to the standard of review and bur-
den of proof applicable on the interlocutory appeal. In keeping with the
express terms of the statute,67 the court first decided that it would judge
whether the joinder was proper based on an independent determination
from the record. 68 Notwithstanding the statutory mandate that plaintiff
"establish" the joinder requirements, 69 the court next decided that plain-
tiffs need not prove these requirements by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.70 Instead, plaintiffs' prima facie proof would be accepted as
controlling unless conclusively "destroyed" by evidence to the contrary.71
The court sharply divided, however, in attempting to apply this somewhat
lax standard. The justice authoring the plurality opinion of the court con-
cluded that the appellants had made prima facie proof of "essential
need"-one of the statutory requirements 72-by proving the need to pool
resources against common experts and issues. 73 Apparently accepting
this reasoning, the concurring justice observed that intrastate plaintiffs
could never join mass tort litigation if the court gave "essential need" its
common meaning. 74 Nevertheless, he warned that courts should not
thwart the legislative intent by failing to curb abusive joinder tactics. 75
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the definition of "essential
need" adopted by the majority did thwart the legislative intent by ignor-
ing the common usage of the legislature's chosen term.76
64. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Goldston, 957 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1997, pet. denied); Surgitek, Inc. v. Adams, 955 S.W.2d 884, 887-88 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1997, pet. requested).
65. See Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d at 36.
66. Id.
67. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999)
(court of appeals shall make independent determination from the record and not under
either an abuse of discretion or substantial evidence standard).
68. See Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d at 36-37.
69. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a)(1)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
70. See Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d at 38.
71. See id.
72. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
73. See Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d at 40.
74. See id. at 42 (Rickhoff, J., concurring).
75. See id. The concurring opinion explicitly recognized that eighty-five of the plain-
tiffs, all of whom were from outside the state, were "Polaris forum shoppers." Id.; see
generally Polaris Inv. Mgt. Corp. v. Abascal, 890 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1994, orig. proceeding), leave denied, 892 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1995) (abusive joinder case in
which puffing hyperbole enticed thousands of plaintiffs to Texas' most remote venue). The
proper way to remove them, however, was to grant a traditional forum non conveniens
motion. See Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d at 40 n.7.
76. See id. at 43, (Duncan, J., dissenting). The majority's conclusion that the required
trial in Bexar County as to two of the plaintiffs was some evidence that Bexar County
would be a fair and convenient forum for the defendants under § 15.003(a)(4) as to the
1999] 1491
SMU LAW REVIEW
Finally, in In re Smith Barney, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court an-
nounced that "[t]he doctrine of forum non conveniens applies even when
a trial court's jurisdiction is clear. ' 77 Thus, according to the court, a for-
eign corporation's statutory power to sue in Texas does not afford it an
absolute right to sue non-residents in Texas courts.78 Smith Barney over-
rules the decision almost sixty years ago in H. Rouw Co. v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 79 which had been the subject of some earlier criticism.80
V. PARTIES
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permit a trial court to certify a class
action if the proposed representative parties establish all four prerequi-
sites of Rule 42(a)8"1 and at least one of the prerequisites of Rule 42(b). 82
In Remington Arms Co. v. Luna,83 the trial court certified a class action
under Rule 42(b)(4), 84 which requires the plaintiffs to show that common
questions of law or fact predominate and that a class action is the supe-
rior method of resolving the controversy. 85 The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the class action was inferior and unmanageable when
compared to traditional litigation.8 6 In reaching this conclusion, the ap-
pellate court agreed with the defendant that the class litigation would
leave multiple individual issues unresolved, overburden the county of
suit, and operate to coerce settlement. 87 Commenting upon the absence
of other litigation about the precise product defect alleged in the suit, the
court also found no evidence as to the "maturity" of the claim or the
interest of potential class members in pursuing the claim. 88 Indeed, the
record suggested a lack of interest beyond the four named plaintiffs and
"even some indifference among them." 89 Under these circumstances, the
other plaintiffs, 975 S.W.2d at 41, seems at odds with the statute's mandate that a plaintiff
establish the joinder requirements independent of any other plaintiff.
77. 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
78. See id. at 597-598.
79. 154 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1941, writ ref'd), overruled by Smith
Barney, 975 S.W.2d at 598.
80. See '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 479, 485-86
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (Peeples, J., concurring) (describing H. Rouw
decision as poorly reasoned).
81. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (setting forth requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation).
82. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Forsyth v. Lake LBJ Inv. Corp., 903 S.W.2d 146, 149-50
(Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (discussed in A. Erin Dwyer, et al, Texas Civil
Procedure Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. Rev. 1371, 1378 (1996)).
83. 966 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
84. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4).
85. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4) lists several factors relevant to assessing the superiority of
a class action, including the interest of class members in individually controlling separate
litigation, the difficulties likely to be encountered in management of the class action, and
whether its desirable to concentrate litigation of the claims in the particular forum.
86. See Luna, 966 S.W.2d at 644.
87. See id. at 643.
88. See id. at 644. The court also found no evidence in the record demonstrating litiga-




court said "the trial [judge's] analysis [was] based on speculation and, as
such, [constituted] an abuse of discretion." 90
Two other class action cases involved issues relating to the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).91 In America Online, Inc. v. Wil-
liams,92 for example, the court held that the trial court abused its
discretion by certifying a class action during the mandatory DTPA abate-
ment period.93 The trial court apparently agreed with America Online
(AOL) that abatement was appropriate because the plaintiffs had failed
to provide the requisite notice. Nevertheless, it proceeded with the certi-
fication hearing over AOL's objection on the basis that an abatement to
permit pre-certification notice "made no sense."' 94 Once the class was
certified, the trial court ordered abatement until sixty days after notice on
behalf of the entire class was given. In contrast, the appellate court held
that the abatement was automatic and mandatory under the clear lan-
guage of the statute.95 Therefore, the trial court erred when it conducted
the certification hearing because "[a]n abatement is a present suspension
of all proceedings in the suit."'96
Less clear to the court was what type of notice should be given in class
actions.97 The representative plaintiffs argued that no notice would be
meaningful until the class was certified. The court rejected this argument,
concluding instead that "[t]he DTPA notice in class actions should con-
tain the specific allegations and demand by the named plain-
tiffs[,] [together with a] demand that the defendant settle with others
similarly situated. '98 Among other things, the court observed that, until a
class was certified, the action should be treated as if it were brought by
the plaintiffs suing on their own behalf. 99 Specifically, individual notice
of the representatives' claims, said the court, would also further the im-
portant legislative goal of encouraging settlements.100
The defendant in Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Tal 101 also complained
about a trial court's refusal to abate the class certification hearing, but
with much less success. Plaintiffs filed both their petition and their later
motion for class certification during the sixty day period of abatement.
The court's order scheduling the class certification hearing was also
signed during the abatement period. But the hearing itself occurred
90. Id.
91. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1999).
92. 958 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
93. Id. at 272; see TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
94. Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 273.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 272 (quoting Permanente Med. Ass'n of Tex. v. Johnson, 917 S.W.2d 515,517
(Tex. App.-Waco 1996, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus when trial court only par-
tially abated proceedings)).
97. See Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 273.
98. Id. at 276.
99. See id. at 273; see also Palais Royal, Inc. v. Partida, 916 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding).
100. See Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 275-76.
101. 972 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
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shortly after the abatement expired, so the court of appeals held that the
order certifying the class did not violate any abatement. 102 Still, the ap-
pellate court reversed the order of class certification holding that the
plaintiffs failed to establish numerosity.'0 3 The court refused to consider
affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs in response to defendant's motion
for reconsideration because they were not before the trial court at the
time it ordered certification.10 4 The court was also unwilling to rely on
"bare assertions" in the petition that the defendant hospital routinely de-
stroyed X-rays of its patients because these unsubstantiated allegations
were not a matter of common knowledge. 0 5
Questions about interlocutory appeals from class certification orders
continue to bombard the courts. Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, which authorizes the taking of interlocutory ap-
peals in limited instances, allows a party to appeal from an interlocutory
order that "certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under
Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure."'01 6 According to the
Texas Supreme Court in Stary v. DeBord, that grant of appellate jurisdic-
tion does not extend to interlocutory orders striking shareholder deriva-
tive claims.10 7 Rule 42 also makes clear that the pendency of an appeal
from an order certifying a class action suspends the effect of the trial
court's order.' 0 8 Therefore, the court in Central Power & Light Co. v. San
Juan0 9 held that the trial court's order authorizing plaintiff to send no-
tices to potential class members was suspended once the defendant per-
fected its interlocutory appeal." 0 O'Reilly v. Brodie holds that non-class
members have no standing to appeal a judgment approving the settle-
ment of a class action.' Although the court considered the question a
case of first impression in Texas,' 1 2 it looked for guidance to federal
law' 13 and a recent decision of a sister court of appeals. 14 Finally, in
102. See id. at 897.
103. See id. at 899.
104. See id. at 898.
105. See id. at 899. In another case decided during the survey period, the same court
acknowledged the principle that class certification may be determined on the basis of
pleadings, but that the "certification determination usually should be predicated on more
information than the petition itself" affords. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of Pharr,
962 S.W.2d 631, 640 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. dism'd. w.o.j.).
106. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(3)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
107. 967 S.W. 2d 352, 353 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
108. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
109. 962 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. dism'd. w.o.j.).
110. See id. at 602. Because notices had already been sent pursuant to the trial court's
order, the plaintiff was ordered to send a written notice of retraction to every recipient of
the earlier class notice. See id.
111. 975 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
112. See id. at 59.
113. See id. at 59-60; Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1058, 110 S.Ct. 870, 107 L.Ed.2d 953 (1989) (only named class members have standing
to object to a settlement); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 342-
43 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (non-class members lacked standing to object to settlement).
114. See O'Reilly, 975 S.W.2d at 59; San Juan 1990-A, L.P. v. Meridian Oil Inc., 951
S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
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Daughety v. National Ass'n of Homebuilders, the court of appeals found
no fault with a trial court for failing to certify a class action on some basis
other than what plaintiffs had requested.11 5 Although the plaintiffs went
to the class certification hearing on one basis, a nationwide class as to
seven causes of action, they appealed the trial court's ruling on another
basis, a different nationwide class based on one cause of action.116 The
court of appeals refused to countenance plaintiffs' change of heart, hold-
ing that a trial court's failure to grant a class action proponent less than
he specifically requested does not constitute an abuse of discretion.117
VI. PLEADINGS
Rule 166a expressly permits the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment to file an amended pleading after the summary judgment hear-
ing with leave of court. 1 8 It is also well-established that a trial court does
not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider amended pleadings filed
after the hearing without leave.119 Sometimes, however, a trial court's
order granting leave to file an amended pleading in the summary judg-
ment context is still not enough. The court in Automaker, Inc. v. C.C.R.T.
Co., Ltd.120 held that a trial judge cannot grant a motion to amend the
pleadings once it has already rendered a summary judgment, even if the
order granting leave is signed while the court still possesses plenary
power.1 21 The court remarked that "[p]ublic policy concerns favoring the
finality of judgments counsel against allowing a party to set aside a judg-
ment covertly, e.g., by a post-judgment motion requesting permission to
file amended pleadings. 122 If the losing party seeks to set aside or mod-
ify the summary judgment, it should do so openly by filing a motion for
new trial or to modify the judgment.1 23
In Friesenhahn v. Ryan,124 the supreme court reiterated that a court
may not grant a "no cause of action" summary judgment without giving a
party an adequate opportunity to amend.125 Based on this rule, the court
reversed a summary judgment entered by the trial judge after she had
earlier sustained special exceptions to the causes of action brought by the
plaintiffs in their representative capacities.1 26 The trial court's ruling on
the special exceptions put the plaintiffs on notice of the pleading defect,
115. 970 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet. h.).
116. See id. at 181.
117. See id. at 182.
118. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
119. See, e.g., Leinen v. Buffington's Bayou City Serv. Co., 824 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984), affd, 686 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1985).
120. 976 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
121. See id. at 746.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. 960 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1998).
125. See id. at 659 (citing Pietila v. Crites, 851 S.W.2d 185, 186 n.2 (Tex. 1993)).
126. See Ryan, 960 S.W.2d at 659.
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but it did not permit them to amend their pleadings until after the sum-
mary judgment hearing. As a result, the supreme court determined that
the trial judge had not afforded plaintiffs an opportunity to cure the
pleading defects before she granted judgment. 127 The court also over-
turned the summary judgment entered against plaintiffs in their individ-
ual capacities on similar grounds. 12 8 Because the trial court had denied
special exceptions addressed to the individual claims, plaintiffs were
never on notice that these pleadings were deficient before the summary
judgment was entered. 129
VII. DISCOVERY
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court adopted substan-
tial revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery.
These new rules went into effect January 1, 1999. The major changes ef-
fected by these revisions are discussed below, as are significant cases de-
cided during the Survey period that are of continuing relevance.
A. PROCEDURES
1. Rule Changes
The new discovery rules aim to streamline discovery procedures and to
reduce the time and expense attendant to prior discovery practices. To-
ward this end, all cases must now be governed by a discovery control
plan. 130 Generally speaking, Level One discovery control plans govern
suits where the plaintiff seeks only monetary relief of less than $50,000.131
All other suits are subject to Level Two discovery control plans, unless
the court enters a tailored Level Three plan.' 32 Under both Level One
and Level Two, parties are limited to twenty-five interrogatories. 133 In
addition the total number of hours of oral depositions (examination and
cross-examination) is limited to six hours per party in a Level One case 134
and fifty hours per side in a Level Two case. 135
The revised rules also add a new form of permissible discovery to state
court practice-requests for disclosure.' 3 6 Requests for disclosure allow
a party, through a simple, one-sentence request, to obtain the basic infor-
mation required in most lawsuits (e.g., persons with knowledge of rele-




130. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.1.
131. See TEX. R. Cv. P. 190.2(a).
132. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.3(a); 190.4(a).
133. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.2(c)(3); 190.3(b)(3).
134. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.2(c)(2). (The parties can, by agreement, expand this limit
to ten hours.)
135. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.3(b)(2). ("Side" refers to parties that are generally aligned.
Id. If one side designates more than two experts, the other side is entitled to an additional
six hours of deposition time for each additional expert.)
136. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.1 (a).
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contentions). 137 The responding party is not permitted to object or assert
work product in response to a request for disclosure. 138 A party's re-
sponse regarding its contentions or claimed damages is not admissible
and may not be used for impeachment, however, if it has been amended
or supplemented.1 39
Practitioners must also contend with new rules regarding the proper
manner for responding to discovery. For example, parties no longer must
verify interrogatory answers regarding persons with knowledge of rele-
vant facts, trial witnesses, or legal contentions. 14 In addition, the rules
now explicitly require a good faith basis for objections to written discov-
ery,141 as well as a provision that an objection may be waived if it "is
obscured by numerous unfounded objections. 1 42 On the other hand,
Rule 193.2(d) tries to eliminate prophylactic objections by allowing re-
sponses to be amended to state an objection that was inapplicable, or
unknown after reasonable inquiry, when the original response was
made.143 New Rule 193 also revamps the method for asserting and pre-
serving a claim of privilege, which is discussed infra. Finally, under Rule
193.7, documents produced by a party are automatically authenticated for
use against that party unless, within ten days after the party has actual
notice that a document will be used, an objection to its authenticity is
made.144
Perhaps the most controversial of the amendments to the discovery
rules are those affecting depositions. Examination and cross-examination
of a witness in a deposition is now limited to six hours per side.145 Private
conferences between a witness and her attorney during the taking of the
deposition are improper except for the purpose of determining the appli-
cability of a privilege. 146 If lawyers or witnesses do not comply with this
admonition, or are uncooperative, discourteous, or dilatory, the court
may allow the jury to see or hear what transpired at a deposition that may
reflect upon the credibility of the witness.1 47
In a similar vein, counsel are now required to limit their objections to
deposition questions to "Objection, leading" and "Objection, form" and
their objections to testimony to "Objection, nonresponsive." 148 Signifi-
cantly, objections stated other than in the prescribed manner are
137. See TEX. R. Clv. P. 194.1; 194.2.
138. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 194.5.
139. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 194.6. This same rule prevails for amended or supplemental
interrogatory answers addressing these subjects. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 197.3.
140. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 197.2(d)(2). The identification of expert witnesses, which has
traditionally been obtained through interrogatories, can now only be obtained through a
request for disclosure. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 195.1.
141. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.2(c).
142. See TEX. R. Cirv. P. 193.2(e).
143. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 193.2(d).
144. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.7.
145. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 199.5(c).
146. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.5(d).
147. See id.
148. TEX. R. Crv. P. 199.5(e).
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waived. 149 An attorney for a witness may, however, instruct the witness
not to answer a question if necessary to protect a privilege, comply with a
court order or the discovery rules, or protect a witness from an abusive
question or one for which an answer would be misleading. 150
2. Cases
Although trial courts have broad discretion over the scope and manner
of conducting discovery, In re Colonial Pipeline Co. 15 1 reemphasizes that
such discretion is not unbounded. In that case, brought by over 3,000
plaintiffs, the trial court prohibited any discovery from all but the ten
plaintiffs whose claims had been selected to be resolved first. 152 While
encouraging a trial court's innovation in managing mass tort cases, the
supreme court held that blocking even the most basic discovery from the
vast majority of claimants was an abuse of discretion. 153 The court also
resolved two other procedural questions. First, it held that the trial court
had no authority to order the defendants to create an inventory of all of
the documents they had produced in other, related litigation.t 54 Second,
the court held that a party should ordinarily be allowed sufficient time to
review the opposing party's written discovery responses prior to taking
such party's deposition. 55 Thus, the trial court in Colonial Pipeline
abused its discretion when, for no legitimate reason, it allowed the plain-
tiffs in the initial trial group to provide their written discovery responses
at the time of their depositions. 56
The scope of a discovery master's authority was at issue in In re
Sheets.157 The parties in that case consented to a master hearing discov-
ery disputes, and a referral order was entered. 158 At one party's urging,
the trial court entered a second order expanding the master's authority to
all pretrial matters except summary judgment motions.1 59 Finding that
the other party had not consented to this expansion of authority, and that
there was no evidence of the exceptional circumstances that would justify
the use of a master in the absence of consent, the court of appeals held
that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the second order.160
In recent years the Texas courts have grown protective of high-ranking
corporate officials from whom "apex" depositions are sought. This trend
continued during the Survey period. For example, the court in In re El
149. See id.
150. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 199.5(f).
151. 968 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1998).
152. See id. at 940.
153. See id. at 942.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 943.
156. See id.
157. 971 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, orig. proceeding).
158. See id. at 746.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 747-48. See also Ex parte DeLeon, 972 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1998) (master
was without authority to enforce directive to witness with power of contempt).
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Paso Healthcare System 161 issued a writ of mandamus to block an "apex"
deposition despite the fact that the officer in question was president only
of a division subsidiary and had, in any event, left the corporation since
the time the deposition was originally requested. 162 In re Daisy Manufac-
turing Co.163 involved the requested deposition of the defendant's chief
executive officer. Although the executive had appeared on a television
news program to speak to the safety of the defendant's products, the
court of appeals overturned the trial court's decision to allow his deposi-
tion, holding that "[mlerely espous[ing] a generalized opinion concerning
the safety of one of his company's products [did] not imbue that official
with unique or superior knowledge of the product"., 64
B. PRIVILEGE
1. Rule Changes
The 1999 amendments worked several significant changes to Texas law
of privilege. First, the rules now define work product for the first time 165
and provide that it is to be asserted as a privilege. 166 Specifically, work
product is defined to include (1) materials prepared and mental impres-
sions developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial by a party, its at-
torney, agents, or insurers,167 and (2) party communications that were
previously protected by former Rule 166b(3)(d). 168 The new rule distin-
guishes between "core" work product, which reflects the attorney's
mental processes and is not discoverable, from other work product, which
is discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain
the substantial equivalent without undue hardship.169 Finally, the rule
provides that specified information that might have previously been
claimed to be work product, including the identity of trial witnesses, is
not protected. 170
The procedure for invoking privilege has been substantially changed by
new Rule 193. A party is no longer required to object on privilege
grounds.171 Instead, at the time a party makes an original or amended
response to written discovery, it can assert a privilege by stating that in-
formation or materials have been withheld and identifying the specific
requests to which the privilege assertion relates and the privilege(s) as-
serted. 172 The requesting party can then ask for identification of the in-
161. 969 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1998, orig. proceeding).
162. See id. at 73-75.
163. 976 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, orig. proceeding).
164. Id. at 329.
165. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(a).
166. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 192.5(d).
167. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 192.5(a)(1).
168. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 192.5(a)(2).
169. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(b).
170. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 192.5(c). The new rules also eliminate the former exemption
for witness statements. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(h).
171. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.2(f).
172. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 193.3(a).
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formation withheld, and the responding party must then produce a
privilege log.' 73 Significantly, this two-step procedure need not be fol-
lowed in order to preserve a claim of attorney-client communication or
work product created in connection with the pending litigation.' 74 More-
over, the entire procedure is triggered only by the actual withholding of
privileged information, and a party need not assert privilege just to pro-
tect against a waiver with respect to information or documents that are
subsequently uncovered. 175
A party need not request a hearing on its assertion of privilege in order
to preserve it.176 As under prior practice, however, if a hearing is re-
quested, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving its
applicability.177 Moreover, if a party withholds materials or information
based on a claim of privilege, it may not use that material or information
at any hearing or trial unless it timely supplements. 178
2. Cases
In re Anderson presented the rare case in which a claim of privilege
successfully precluded a party from obtaining information that the rules
explicitly make discoverable.179 The plaintiff sought the identity of per-
sons with knowledge of relevant facts, including those who had made sim-
ilar complaints against the defendant-doctor. 18 0 The court held, however,
that this information was not discoverable because the physician-patient
privilege protected not only communications, but also the identity of pa-
tients. 181 Moreover, the court held that the privilege belonged to the pa-
tients and, therefore, was not waived by the doctor's failure to properly
and timely object.182
C. SUPPLEMENTATION
The amended rules modify and clarify the body of case law developed
over the last fifteen years in the area of supplementation of discovery
responses. As a starting point, the rules now expressly impose on liti-
gants a general duty to amend or supplement responses to written discov-
ery that were incomplete or incorrect when made or that, while complete
and correct when made, are no longer complete and correct. 183 This obli-
gation is absolute in the case of requests for the identification of persons
with knowledge of relevant facts, trial witnesses, and expert witnesses. 184
173. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(b).
174. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(c).
175. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193 cmt. 3.
176. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.4(b).
177. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.4(a).
178. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.4(c).
179. 973 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, orig. proceeding).
180. See id. at 411.
181. See id. at 411-12.
182. See id. at 412.
183. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.5(a).
184. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.5(a)(1).
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It is qualified as to all other information, however, such that an amended
or supplemental response is necessary "unless the additional or corrective
information has been made known to the other parties in writing, on the
record at a deposition, or through other discovery responses. ' '185 Thus,
the new rule looks to whether the substance of the changed or additional
information has been adequately conveyed. Thus, the prior case law that
refused to allow informal supplementation is effectively overruled.
Rule 193.5 requires an amended or supplemental response to be made
"reasonably promptly" after a party discovers the need therefor. 186
Rather than setting an absolute deadline of thirty days before trial for
supplementation, the new rule establishes a presumption that an
amended or supplemental response served less than thirty days before
trial was not made reasonably promptly.187
Amended and supplemental responses to written discovery requests
must be in the same form as the original responses. 188 Moreover, if an
original interrogatory answer was required to be verified, then any
amended or supplemental answer must likewise be verified. 189 Of course,
as discussed supra, interrogatory answers disclosing persons with knowl-
edge of relevant facts, trial witnesses, and legal contentions no longer
need to be verified, and expert witness disclosure is no longer even a
permissible topic for interrogatories. Since these items make up a sub-
stantial percentage of the information that typically needs to be updated,
the requirement that supplemental answers be verified likely will not
prove to be onerous. Moreover, the failure to verify an amended or sup-
plemental response where required does not render it untimely, unless
the defect is pointed out and the responding party refuses to correct it.190
Rule 193.6 continues the general rule that a party may not introduce
into evidence material or information that it has not timely disclosed, or
offer the testimony of a witness (other than a named party) who was not
timely identified, in an original, amended or supplemental discovery re-
sponse.19' Unlike old Rule 215(5), however, the new rule gives trial
judges far more flexibility in deciding whether to impose this exclusionary
sanction. In this connection, undisclosed information or witnesses can
still be offered at trial if the court finds that "good cause" exists for the
failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the response. 192 Under the
new rule, moreover, a party may offer evidence or call witnesses who
were not timely disclosed if the court finds that the other parties will not
be unfairly surprised or prejudiced. 93 This is a new provision that breaks
185. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.5(a)(2).
186. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.5(b).
187. See id.
188. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 193.5(b).
189. See id.
190. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 193.5(b).
191. See TEX. R. Clv. P. 193.6(a).
192. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a)(1).
193. See TEX. R. Cirv. P. 193.6(a)(2).
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with prior Texas Supreme Court authority holding that lack of surprise or
prejudice did not establish good cause. 194
D. SANCrIONS
The supreme court addressed the propriety of a trial court's discovery
sanction in In re Ford Motor Co.195 The court of appeals had already
struck down the news-making $10 million sanction that had been levied
against Ford by the trial court in the underlying action. 196 On further
mandamus review, the supreme court found that the defendant had not
engaged in any sanctionable conduct at all. 197 Nevertheless, the court
denied mandamus relief with respect to the order excluding certain evi-
dence and requiring Ford to pay $25,000 in attorneys' fees incurred in the
trial court, holding that Ford had an adequate remedy on appeal.1 98 The
high court found, however, that the trial court's award of additional attor-
neys' fees if Ford sought mandamus relief, regardless of whether it was
successful, could not be remedied on appeal. 199 A penalty of this type
risked such a "chilling effect" on a party's prospective exercise of its legal
right that the court concluded it should be immediately remedied.200
Two cases decided during the Survey period permitted the imposition
of so-called "death penalty" sanctions despite the trial court's failure to
first impose less severe sanctions. In re Zenergy, Inc. involved what the
court of appeals described as "an extensive course of flagrant discovery
abuse."'20' In response to the relators' argument that the trial judge
abused his discretion in striking their pleadings because he did not first
test the effectiveness of lesser sanctions, the court of appeals noted that
the sanctions proceedings were conducted over a period of almost a full
year, and the relators continued their obstructive efforts throughout that
time. 202 In addition, the trial judge was aware of similar sanctions that
had been rendered against one of the relators, which the others relators
also had knowledge of, which had not deterred their misconduct in this
case.203 On these somewhat novel bases, the court held that the trial
judge could have properly concluded that lesser sanctions would not have
194. See, e.g., Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1986).
195. 41 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 1283 (July 14, 1998).
196. Ford Motor Co. v. Tyson, 943 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, orig. pro-
ceeding) (discussed in A. Erin Dwyer, et al. Texas Civil Procedure Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 51 SMU L. Rev. 1383, 1394-95 [hereinafter 1998 Annual Survey]).
197. See In Re Ford Motor Co., 41 TEX. Sup. CT. J. at 1287.
198. See id. at 1288.
199. See id. at 1289.
200. See id. The dissent argued that the majority's opinion was simply a further erosion
of the rule announced in Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992), particularly since
the amount of fees assessed in this case ($25,000) assuredly had no "chilling effect" on
Ford's willingness to pursue mandamus relief. See In re Ford Motor Co., 41 TEX. Sup. Cr.
J. at 1289-90 (Enoch, J., dissenting).






The court in Daniel v. Kelley Oil Corp. appears to have relied on the
severity of the alleged misconduct - fabrication of a tape recording - in
holding that the trial court was not obliged to first impose lesser sanc-
tions.205 What is even more striking about the case, however, is that the
issue of whether the tape recording was, in fact, fabricated was hotly dis-
puted by both the fact and expert witnesses. 20 6 Over a sharp dissent,20 7 a
narrow majority of the en banc court held that the trial court was author-
ized to make a factual finding of fabrication of evidence,20 8 and that the
appellate court could not say, based on the record, that this finding was
an abuse of discretion.20 9
VIII. DISMISSAL
The supreme court in Newco Drilling Co. v. Weyand 210 held that where
the trial court enters a partial summary judgment and then dismisses the
case for want of prosecution, those issues disposed of by summary judg-
ment are deemed dismissed with prejudice, unless the rulings are later
vacated by the trial court.21 1 In so holding, the court reasoned that a
plaintiff who simply allows its case to be dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion should not stand in a better position than a plaintiff who voluntarily
nonsuits an action when partial summary judgment has been entered
against it.212
Dismissals for want of prosecution were the subject of several opinions
during the Survey period. Perhaps most extreme was the San Antonio
appellate court's affirmation of a dismissal for want of prosecution in Vil-
larreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equipment Inc.2 1 3 In that case, the trial
court issued a notice setting the case for dismissal and requiring the plain-
tiff to make an announcement by a specified date.214 The day preceding
the scheduled dismissal hearing, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to set
the case for a jury trial (but did not obtain a trial setting), and then com-
plied with the trial court's notice by attending the dismissal hearing as
scheduled. Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed the case for want of
prosecution.2 1 5 A divided appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its inherent authority to
204. See id.
205. 981 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
206. See id. at 233.
207. See id. at 236-237 (Mirabel, J., dissenting).
208. See id. at 232.
209. See id. at 232.
210. 960 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1998).
211. Id. at 655.
212. See id. at 656 (citing Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex.
1995)).
213. 974 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. granted). Editor's note: The
Texas Supreme Court has recently issued an opnion reversing the court of appeals' deci-
sion. See Villareal v. San Antonio Truck & Equipment, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999).




dismiss the case for want of prosecution for lack of apparent activity.216
In a case of apparent first impression, the court in Dickerson v. Sonat
Exploration Co., 2 1 7 held that where the district court initiates the dismis-
sal of a cause of action for want of prosecution, and the dismissal notices
are later returned to the court as undeliverable, it is incumbent upon the
clerk of the court to reexamine the file for evidence of a more recent
address. 218 Thus, the court granted the appellant's writ of error, holding
that the failure to do so resulted in a deprivation of the appellant's consti-
tutional right to notice.219
The Austin appellate court affirmed a trial court's dismissal for failure
to prosecute in Burton v. Hoffman,220 where the plaintiff's lead counsel
had two cases set for trial the same day in different counties. Following
the Austin trial court's denial of a motion for continuance the previous
Friday, the plaintiff's counsel sent an associate to the trial court who ap-
peared but refused to prosecute the case, claiming he was unprepared to
proceed. In affirming the dismissal, the appellate court distinguished this
case from a dismissal for want of prosecution under Rule 165a(1) because
the associate refused to proceed with the lawsuit when it was called to
trial.221
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a 222 permits a party to use unfiled
discovery products as summary judgment evidence if the party timely
files an appropriate notice containing specific references to the discovery
it intends to use.223 Appeals courts have split on the question whether a
notice sufficiently complies with the rule's requirements when it cites only
page numbers on the unfiled discovery, being referenced. 224 The court in
Salmon v. Miller225 could have avoided the question altogether inasmuch
as the 166a(d) notice there made no specific reference to the page num-
bers or other location of the evidence relied upon, much less point out its
exact language. 226 The court chose sides anyway, agreeing in dicta with
those courts that have interpreted the "specific reference" language of
the rule as requiring a party to "show the court language from an unfiled
216. See id. at 278.
217. 975 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, pet. denied).
218. Id. at 342.
219. See id.
220. 959 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
221. See id. at 353-54 (noting that this holding was further justified based on counsel's
knowledge of the conflicting trial settings and the admission of counsel at the prior contin-
uance hearing that the wrong defendant had been sued); See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(1).
222. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(d).
223. See id. (requiring movants to file the notice at least twenty-one days before the
hearing and requiring respondents to file notice at least seven days before the hearing).
224. Compare Grainger v. Western Cas. Life Ins. Co., 930 S.W.2d 609, 613-614 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) with E.B. Smith Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 850 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
225. 958 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
226. Id. at 428.
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deposition or other unfiled discovery document before the court rules on
the summary judgment motion. '2 27 In a note to the prudent practitioner,
the court also cited the supreme court's decision that the Rule 166a(d)
statement of intent is satisfied when the discovery is actually attached to
the motion.22 8
Farroux v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc.22 9 also concerned the sufficiency
of summary judgment evidence. The defendant in Farroux supported its
motion for summary judgment with admissions made by the plaintiff in
his deposition testimony. In response to the motion, the plaintiff submit-
ted an affidavit in which he contradicted his earlier deposition testimony.
The court of appeals held the affidavit was insufficient to create a fact
issue because it did not explain the reason for the plaintiff's change in
testimony.2 30 Without an explanation for this change, the court assumed
the sole purpose of the affidavit was to avoid judgment and, therefore, it
presented only a "sham" issue of fact.2 31 As support for these conclu-
sions, the court cited supporting federal law 232 but ignored countervailing
Texas authority.2 33
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed summary judgment proce-
dure during the Survey period. In CU Lloyd's of Texas v. Feldman,234 the
high court announced that a court of appeals may not "render judgment
on a party's liability for breach of contract without evidence of damages
and when no declaratory judgment has been sought. '2 35 In order for an
appellate court to reverse and render judgment when it is considering
cross motions for summary judgment, both parties must ordinarily have
sought final judgment relief in their motions. 236
Finally, in Holmes v. Ottawa Truck, Inc.,2 3 7 the court held that a sum-
mary judgment response served by mail need not be served ten days
before the hearing.2 38 Although the court acknowledged that Rule 21a 239
227. Id. (quoting E.B. Smith Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 850 S.W.2d 621
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied)).
228. See Salmon, 958 S.W.2d at 427 (citing McConathy v. McConathy, 869 S.W.2d 341,
342 n.2 (Tex. 1994)).
229. 962 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
230. See id. at 111. (offering examples of possible explanations, including confusion dur-
ing the deposition, or that additional, relevant materials were discovered after the deposi-
tion. Id. at 111, n.1).
231. See id. at 111.
232. See id., (citing Bank of Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162,
1168-69 (7th Cir. 1996)).
233. See Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. 1988); see also
Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 626, 358 S.W.2d 557, 562 (1962).
234. 977 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1998).
235. Id. at 568.
236. See id. at 569.
237. 960 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied).
238. Id. at 869.
239. TEX. R. Crv. P. 21a (stating that service by mail shall be complete upon depositing
the document in the mail, but extends the minimum notice by three days whenever a party
has the right or is required to do some act within a prescribed period after the service of
such notice by mail).
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and Rule 166a(c)2 40 were "seriously lacking in harmony," it declined to
create different deadlines for the filing and for the service of a summary
judgment response sent by mail.2 41
X. JURY PRACTICE
The Texas Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Texas
Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.06(d),2 42 which regulates
lawyers' post-verdict communications with jurors in Commission for
Lawyer Discipline v. Benton.243 In Benton, an attorney representing an
unsuccessful plaintiff in a personal injury case wrote each of the jurors
four months after their service rearguing the merits of the case, and, in
essence, admonishing the jurors for rendering an unjust judgment. The
attorney admitted the conduct at issue during disciplinary proceedings,
but argued that Rule 3.06(d) 244 was unconstitutional in that it violated his
free speech rights, was over-broad and vague, and denied him equal pro-
tection under the law. The court concluded that, upon balancing an attor-
neys' role in the judicial process against his right to free speech, Rule
3.06(d) did not violate the attorney's free speech rights because his letter
"created a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the administra-
tion of justice. '2 45 The court also noted that the attorney's letter had the
possible effect of negatively influencing jurors in future deliberations and
discouraging future jury service, contrary to the intent of Rule 3.06(d).246
The court further held that Rule 3.06(d)'s prohibition against comments
that harass or embarrass a former juror was neither unconstitutionally
over-broad nor a violation of equal protection guarantees under state or
federal law.247
The court did, however, express more significant concerns about
whether Rule 3.06(d) is unconstitutionally vague as it relates to the man-
ner in which the term "calculated" modifies the verbs "harass," "embar-
rass" and "influence. ' 248 In that regard, the court interpreted the word
"calculated" in Rule 3.06(d) as an objective one, meaning that a lawyer
shall not make a communication that "an ordinary reasonable lawyer
would foresee is likely to harass, embarrass, or influence an ordinary ju-
240. TEX. R. CIv. P. 166a(c) (providing that the adverse party may file and serve oppos-
ing affidavits or other written response to a motion for summary judgment not later than
seven days prior to the day of hearing except on leave of court).
241. See Holmes, 960 S.W.2d at 869.
242. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.06(d).
243. 980 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1998).
244. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.06(d) provides:
After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a matter with which
the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make com-
ments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or em-
barrass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service.
Id.
245. Benton, 980 S.W. 2d at 432.
246. See id. at 432-433.
247. See id. at 436.
248. See id. at 438.
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ror".249 The court concluded that the verb "harass" was not unconstitu-
tionally vague when it is defined as "(1) a course of conduct, (2) directed
at a specific person, (3) causing or tending to cause substantial distress,
and (4) having no legitimate purpose". 250 The court did find that the
word "embarrass," as used in Rule 3.06(d), was unconstitutionally
vague. 25' At trial, Benton admitted violating the "influence" clause of
Rule 3.06(d). However, because the trial court based its punishment of
the attorney on both the "harass" and the unconstitutionally vague "em-
barrass" clauses of the rule, the court remanded the case to the trial court
for a new hearing on the punishment phase of the disciplinary
proceeding. 252
The Beaumont appellate court issued two opinions interpreting Rule
327's253 mandate regarding juror misconduct during the Survey period.
First, in Doucet v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,254 an asbestos case,
the plaintiffs appealed a take-nothing judgment, claiming that juror mis-
conduct deprived them of their right to a fair and impartial jury. Specifi-
cally, a juror incorrectly completed a juror information card by denying
having been a party to civil litigation, and then failed to respond to a voir
dire inquiry regarding prior asbestos-related claims. The appellate court
concluded that the juror at issue had, in fact, failed to disclose his prior
suit against an asbestos manufacturer.255 Nonetheless the court con-
cluded that although the plaintiffs had proved the existence of material
juror misconduct, they were not entitled to a new trial because they could
not prove that the juror's conduct likely resulted in harm or injury, as it
appeared that the juror at issue would likely have been more biased in
favor of the plaintiffs than the defendant.256
Second, and more importantly, the same panel in Jackson v. Golden
Eagle Archery, Inc.,257 determined that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
327258 was unconstitutional in precluding a litigant from proving certain
types of juror misconduct, thereby depriving the party of its constitutional
right to a fair and impartial jury.259 Both procedural Rule 327(b) and
evidentiary Rule 606(b)260 preclude a juror from testifying about "any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's delibera-
tions or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions .... 261 In fact, a juror may only testify if an "outside influence
249. Id. at 439.
250. Id. at 439-40.
251. See id. at 440.
252. See id. at 443.
253. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327.
254. 966 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied).
255. See id. at 163.
256. See id. at 164-65.
257. 974 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. granted).
258. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327.
259. Jackson, 974 S.W.2d at 958.
260. TEX. R. Crv. P. 327(b); TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
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was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. '262
In this case, one of the jurors failed to disclose her bias against the
plaintiff's lawsuit and then disobeyed the trial court's instructions against
premature deliberations, all of which rendered her an incompetent juror.
However, the evidence presented to support this conclusion all consisted
of affidavits and testimony regarding statements of the errant juror made
following jury selection and during deliberations, which are inadmissible
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 327(b) and Texas Rule of Evidence
606(b). Therefore, the court concluded that Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 327(b) was unconstitutional because it prevents inquiry into the type
of misconduct that occurred here.263
XI. JURY CHARGE
Several Texas courts addressed the issue of spoliation of evidence dur-
ing the Survey period. Most significantly, in Trevino v. Ortega,264 the
Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize an independent cause of ac-
tion for either intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence. 265 The
court instead held that such claims of spoliation are best addressed within
the context of the lawsuit affected by the alleged spoliation through the
procedural tools available to the trial court, such as jury instructions and
sanctions. 266 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the al-
leged damages resulting from evidence spoliation are speculative because
evidence destruction "tips the balance in a lawsuit, '267 but "does not cre-
ate damages amenable to monetary compensation. ' 268 The court further
held that the recognition of an independent tort for evidence spoliation
could permit a party subsequently and collaterally to attack an adverse
judgment, thus undermining the strong policy considerations in favor of
finality of judgments. 269
Consistent with the holding in Trevino, two appellate courts reviewed
the propriety of jury instructions regarding spoliation of evidence, each
finding error in the jury instruction sufficient to warrant a reversal and
remand back to the trial court. In Tucker v. Terminix International Co.,270
a homeowner sued Terminix under a variety of legal theories for the com-
pany's application of pesticides to the plaintiff's home. In connection
with the dispute, the homeowner's counsel ordered soil samples to be
gathered, tested, and then retained by a third party for purposes of the
lawsuit. However, after conducting the tests and reducing its findings to
writing, the testing company destroyed the soil samples before the de-
262. Id.
263. See Jackson, 974 S.W.2d at 958.
264. 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).
265. Id. at 953; See also Malone v. Foster, 977 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1998)




270. 975 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
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fendant could examine them. Although the trial court concluded that the
destruction of the soil samples was not the plaintiff's fault, it nonetheless
instructed the jury that it should infer that the destroyed evidence was
unfavorable to the plaintiff.271 Finding such an instruction to be harmful
error, the appellate court reversed, concluding that no basis in law existed
for a spoliation instruction when it was undisputed that the plaintiff did
not destroy the evidence and had attempted to ensure the soil samples'
preservation. 272
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Middleton,2 73 the appellate court held that
the trial court erred in submitting a spoliation instruction adverse to Wal-
Mart regarding the loss of photographs that depicted the condition of the
floor at a Wal-Mart location taken by a Wal-Mart employee immediately
after the plaintiff slipped and fell.274 In reaching this conclusion, the
court found no evidence that Wal-Mart intentionally destroyed the pho-
tographs.2 75 In the absence of such intent, the court concluded that a
spoliation instruction was improper, further noting that an instruction
would be warranted only if the party controlling the evidence neither pro-
duced nor testified about it.276 Here, Wal-Mart affirmatively offered tes-
timony from an employee about the condition of the floor at the time of
the fall. Therefore, the spoliation jury instruction was held to be im-
proper and reversible error.2 77
The Texas Supreme Court issued two other noteworthy opinions on the
subject of jury charges during the Survey period. First, in Dallas Market
Center Development Co. v. Liedeker,2 78 a personal injury case, the court
held that Rule 276's279 mandate for an endorsement of "Refused" on all
refused requests is not the exclusive means for preserving error on pro-
posed but refused issues or instructions when it is clear from the record,
as was the case here, that the objecting party timely submitted a proper
issue or instruction, and the court refused that request.280 Second, in
H.E.B. Grocery Co., v. Bilotto,2 81 the court held that a jury question,
which predicated a damage question on a finding of fifty percent or less
comparative negligence, did not constitute a violation of Rule 277282 as
an improper comment on the weight of the evidence, because Rule 277
permits damage questions to be conditioned upon a finding of liability.2 83
271. See id. at 798.
272. See id. at 800.
273. 982 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
274. Id. at 471.
275. See id. at 470.
276. See id.
277. See id at 471-72.
278. 958 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1997).
279. TEX. R. Crv. P. 276.
280. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d at 386.
281. 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998).
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.




The Texas Supreme Court in Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Ken-
neco Energy, Inc.,284 modified the proper method for calculating com-
mon-law prejudgment interest under Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking,
Inc.,285 holding that "prejudgment interest begins to accrue on the earlier
of (1) 180 days after the date a defendant receives written notice of a
claim or (2) the date suit is filed. 28 6 The court held that prejudgment
interest accrues at the rate for post-judgment interest and must be com-
puted as simple interest.287 The court noted that prejudgment interest is
a means of compensating a party for lost use of money damages due be-
tween the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment and reiterated
that prejudgment interest is provided for either by common law or an
enabling statute. 288 The court concluded that the calculation of prejudg-
ment interest in this case was governed by common law, but reasoned
that the common law rule announced in Cavnar28 9 should be conformed
to mirror the legislative scheme provided under the Texas Finance
Code.290
Cavnar originally permitted recovery of prejudgment interest in a per-
sonal injury, wrongful death, and survival actions. Interest under Cavnar
was to be compounded daily (based upon a 365-day year) beginning six
months after the occurrence of the incident giving rise to the claim.291
Two years after Cavnar, the Texas legislature instituted "tort reform" leg-
islation, which largely codified Cavnar; under the statute, however, pre-
judgment interest would accrue on the earlier of (1) 180 days after the
defendant received notice of the claim, or (2) the day suit was filed. 292
Because the claims asserted in Johnson did not fall within coverage of this
new statute, the case would still be governed by common law.293 In an
effort to conform the common law approach to calculating prejudgment
interest to the statute, the court declared that prejudgment interest claims
governed by common law should also "accrue on the earlier of (1) 180
days after the date a defendant receives written notice of a claim, or (2)
the date suit is filed, and that interest shall accrue at the rate for the post
judgment interest, computed as simple interest. '294 Finally, the court
made its holding applicable "to all cases in which judgment is rendered
on or after December 11, 1997, and to all other cases currently in the
284. 962 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1998).
285. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
286. Johnson, 962 S.W.2d at 531 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a)
(Vernon 1997)).
287. See id. at 532 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(g)).
288. See id. at 528 (citing Cavnar, 696 S.W. 2d at 552).
289. 696 S.W.2d at 552.
290. See Johnson, 962 S.W.2d at 528.
291. See id. at 528-29.
292. TEX. R. CIv. STAT. art. 5.06-1.05 § 6a.
293. See Johnson, 962 S.W. 2d at 528 n.9.
294. Id. at 531-32.
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judicial process in which the issue has been preserved. '295
The Texas Supreme Court, in St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Dal-
Worth Tank Co. 296 further held that, in light of its holding in Johnson &
Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc.,297 the trial court erred in
trebling both prejudgment interest and actual damages, and that prejudg-
ment interest in this case "should be awarded on actual damages at the
rate of ten percent per annum, computed as simple interest, and should
not be trebled. ''2 98
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender,299 a case involving a wrongful death
action arising out of alleged gross negligence, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the issue of settlement credits available to a non-settling de-
fendant under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.300 Under Texas Civivl Practice and Remedies Code section
33.012(b), where a claimant settles with one or more persons, the court
must reduce the damages by a credit equal either to a dollar amount or a
percentage based upon the amount of damages. 30 1 However, as the stat-
ute is silent on which party bears the burden to prove the settlement
amount, the court deferred to the common law and concluded that the
defendant seeking the credit bears the burden of proof.30 2
Here, because the settlement amount was placed in evidence by (1) an
announcement of plaintiff's counsel in open court during trial, and (2)
Mobil's written opposition to plaintiffs' motion for judgment, the court
held that the defendant met its burden of proof.30 3 More importantly,
however, the court then addressed the allocation of the settlement credit
between actual and punitive damages, where the settlement agreement is
silent. On this issue the court held that for a settling party to avoid pay-
ing the non-settling party a credit equal to the entire amount, the settling
party must submit a settlement agreement that allocates between actual
and punitive damages before judgment is rendered. 30 4 The court then
remanded the case with additional instructions that its holding "applies to
all cases in which a valid settlement agreement is reached on or after May
8, 1998, and to all other cases currently in the judicial process in which the
issue has been preserved. ' 30 5 For pre-May 8, 1998, cases, the court held
that plaintiffs may prove through extrinsic evidence whether an allocation
between actual and punitive damages was made.306
295. Id. at 533.
296. 974 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1998).
297. See 962 S.W.2d 507; see also supra note 284 and accompanying text.
298. St. Paul Surplus, 974 S.W.2d at 54-55.
299. 968 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1998).
300. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.012(b) (Vernon 1998).
301. See id.
302. See Ellender, 968 S.W.2d at 927.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 928.




J.D. Abrams, Inc. v. Mclver,307 discussed the appropriate settlement
credits in cases in which a party brings individual claims as well as claims
for injury to another person. In such cases, Texas Civil Practice and Rem-
edies Code section 33.012(b), defines the "claimant" as both the plaintiff
filing the claim and the injured party.308 Accordingly, the credits for "all
settlements" entered into by "the claimant" in that case included both
settlements received by the plaintiff individually and as the guardian for
the estate of her daughter.3119 While the court recognized this construc-
tion of the statute might impute a settlement credit to a party where the
settlement funds actually went to another person, the court rationalized
that a settling party might obtain the benefit of being able to settle a case
with the other defendants without the delay or risk of a hearing at which
the non-settling defendant could contest the allocation of settlement
dollars.310
Finally, the court in Fuller-Austin Insulation Co. v. Bilder,31' addressed
the situation in which multiple defendants make conflicting settlement
credit elections, but only one of the defendants remains a party to the
action when the case is finally submitted to the jury. Although Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.014 states how the issue is to
be resolved where the election between or among the defendants is in
conflict 312, the court held that where only one party remains an actual
defendant when the case is submitted to the trier of fact, that party's elec-
tion of settlement credits governs, even if it conflicts with the settlement
credit elected by other defendants that have since been dismissed. 31 3
In Brinkman v. Brinkman,314 the court determined the effect of a prior
divorce proceeding upon a subsequent civil suit between the same parties.
In this case, the court affirmed summary judgment for the ex-husband
based upon res judicata as a result of the prior divorce proceeding. 315 In
so holding, the court reasoned that a party could not threaten certain
claims to gain an advantage in a divorce proceeding and then, having
known of those claims during the divorce, fail to assert them, only to
bring a subsequent civil action seeking recovery for those same alleged
wrongs. 316
The subject of default judgment was addressed in two noteworthy cases
during the Survey period. First, in Okpala v. Coleman,317 a case involving
a landlord tenant dispute, the court held that it was reversible error to
307. 966 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
308. TEX. Civ. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011(1), see J.D. Abrams, 966 S.W. 2d at 96.
309. See id.
310. See id. 966 S.W.2d at 97.
311. 960 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. granted) case abated Oct. 15,
1998.
312. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.014 (Vernon 1997).
313. See Bilder, 960 S.W.2d at 922-23.
314. 966 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
315. See id. at 783.
316. See id.
317. 964 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
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enter a default judgment against a party who had not submitted a formal
"answer" per Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 751 and 753, but had sub-
mitted discovery requests and responses.318 The appellate court reached
its conclusion by examining the discovery on file and holding that it suffi-
ciently placed at issue the claims made the basis of the suit.319 In South-
ern Gulf Operators, Inc. v. Meehan,3 ° the court granted a writ of error
and reversed a default judgment, finding that the record on appeal failed
to conclusively show that, when the default was taken against it, the Sec-
retary of State had forwarded a copy of the process served upon it by
registered mail to the defendant.321 Proof of service that was placed in
the record after the entry of the default judgment did not suffice to com-
ply with rigid service of process requirements. 322
XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Orders are better than letters is the lesson to be learned from In re
Fuentes.323 In this mandamus proceeding, the trial court first denied the
plaintiff's motion for new trial but then sent a letter notifying the parties
of its decision to grant a new trial. In this letter, the court requested
plaintiff's counsel to submit an appropriate order memorializing the
court's ruling; however, for reasons not explained in the opinion, plain-
tiff's counsel failed to submit such an order within seventy-five days after
the entry of judgment. When the trial court subsequently entered an or-
der granting a new trial eighty days after the entry of judgment, the de-
fendants sought mandamus relief, contending that the trial court's
plenary jurisdiction had expired. The appellate court agreed that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction, finding no indication that the trial judge's letter
was ever a part of the court's record.324 Moreover, even if the letter had
been part of the record, it would not have sufficed because it did not
grant or order a new trial.325 Instead the letter clearly contemplated a
future action by requesting that a formal order be submitted. 326
In another mandamus proceeding, In re R.W. Jones, Jr.,327 the appel-
late court held that the parties filing a motion for new trial following the
entry of a default judgment against them failed to comply with the proof
requirements in Rule 306(a)(4). 328 Although generally a motion for new
318. See id. at 700.
319. See id.
320. 969 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet. h.).
321. Id. at 588.
322. See id.
323. 960 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding).
324. See id. at 264-65.
325. See id. at 265.
326. See id.
327. 974 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).
328. See id. at 768-69 (holding that the defendant's motion failed to establish whether
they received notice between the twentieth day after judgment was signed and the day they




trial must be filed within thirty days after the entry of the judgment,329 a
trial court's plenary power to vacate, modify, or correct a final judgment
may be extended under Rule 306a(4) where the party (or its attorney)
adversely affected by the judgment did not receive notice thereof.330
However, the party seeking to invoke Rule 306a(4) must file a sworn mo-
tion stating the date the party or its counsel received notice or acquired
actual knowledge of the judgment and proving that such notice or knowl-
edge was not gained within twenty days of the entry of judgment, which
defendants failed to do. 331 The court rejected defendants' argument that
proof of this fact could simply be inferred from the record and therefore
concluded that the defendants failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdic-
tion to extend the appellate timetable. 332
Finally, in Lowe v. Lowe,333 a post-answer default judgment case in-
volving a divorce/child custody dispute, the court analyzed the appellant's
motion for a new trial, under the well-established three-part test an-
nounced in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.,334 and concluded that
the trial court erred in denying such a motion.335 Specifically, the court
held that the appellant's failure to appear at trial was a result of misinfor-
mation from her attorney advising that she need not attend trial because
the attorney had allegedly obtained a continuance. 336 Unfortunately, this
was not the case. The court further found that the appellant had estab-
lished a meritorious defense and that a new trial would not cause delay or
injure the appellee because the motion for new trial was filed within days
after the entry of a default judgment and the appellant had offered to pay
court costs. 337 However, the court went on to voice its concern about
applying the Craddock test to suits affecting the parent/child relationship,
noting that Craddock was designed to be applied in traditional civil and
commercial litigation that typically only involves the interests of two
competing parties.338 By contrast, suits affecting the parent/child rela-
tionship, by definition, include the rights of a third party, the child, which
the Craddock test was not designed to consider. 339 Accordingly, the
court urged the Texas Supreme Court to fashion a more appropriate rule
for considering motions for new trial in suits involving parent/child
329. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
330. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
331. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5); see also In re Jones, 974 S.W.2d at 769.
332. See In re Jones, 974 S.W.2d at 769; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5); see also TEX.
R. APP. P. 4.2(a).
333. 971 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
334. 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).
335. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d at 727.
336. See id. at 724 (Appellant's counsel had filed a motion for continuance based upon
a conflicting case. However, the trial court overruled the motion for continuance and or-
dered appellant's counsel to appear for jury selection later that morning. When appellant's
counsel failed to appear for trial, the trial court entered a default against appellant in which
child custody and possession of the family home and other property were awarded to the
father and appellant was further ordered to pay child support.)
337. See id. at 725.
338. See id.




XIV. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The supreme court provided guidance on a number of procedural is-
sues that have arisen under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a 34 1 in Gen-
eral Tire, Inc. v. Kepple.3 4 2 First, the court held that a protective order
that restricts, but does not prohibit completely, the dissemination of doc-
uments produced in discovery is subject to the provisions of Rule 76a. 343
A trial court must first determine, however, whether the particular un-
filed discovery at issue is a "court record" subject to the rule. 344 In mak-
ing this determination, the trial judge does not have to follow the full
range of Rule 76a procedures.34 5 Specifically, although the trial court
should allow interested parties to be heard on the issue, if no party or
intervenor argues that the documents are court records, the court does
not need to hold a hearing or make any findings on that issue.346 If the
argument is raised, the court must make this threshold determination, but
public notice and a Rule 76a hearing are still not required unless the
court finds that the discovery is, indeed, a court record.347 Moreover,
until the court determines that the documents are court records that can-
not be sealed, it should not allow intervenors to examine the
documents. 34 8
Finally, the high court also resolved a split among the courts of appeals
on the question of the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's
decision under Rule 76a. 349 Specifically, the court opted for an abuse of
discretion standard of review, rather than a sufficiency of the evidence
standard.350 The court reasoned that, in determining whether to seal
court records, a trial judge "is not called upon to make a factual finding
per se, but rather is required to balance the public's interest in open court
proceedings against an individual litigant's personal or proprietary inter-
est in privacy. ' 35 1 Because this type of balancing requires the exercise of
judicial discretion, appellate courts should review the determination on
340. See id.
341. See generally, TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (regulating the sealing of court records).
342. 970 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998).
343. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 76a; see also Kepple, 970 S.W.2d at 524 (noting that TEx. R.
Civ. P. 166b(5)(c) (repealed Jan. 1, 1999) provided that any protective order entered there-
under conform with TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a with respect to all "court records" subject to the
latter rule).
344. See Kepple, 970 S.W.2d at 524.
345. See id.
346. See id. at 525.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 524-525. The supreme court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the defendant "filed" the documents in question when it produced them to the court for an
in camera inspection, thereby making them court records regardless of whether they would
otherwise meet the test for when unfiled discovery becomes a court record. See id. at 526.
349. See id. at 525-26; see generally TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.





XV. DISQUALIFICATION AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES
Section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code 353 permits a litigant to
disqualify an assigned or visiting judge if he objects before the first hear-
ing or trial over which the assigned judge is scheduled to preside.354 The
question presented in In re Houston Lighting and Power Co.355 was
whether an assigned judge abused his discretion by declining to disqualify
himself in the face of a section 74.053 objection made after the case had
been transferred to his court.
This unusual chain of events began when the original judge voluntarily
recused herself from the case. Over the next few months, the presiding
judge of the region assigned four different judges to the case in succes-
sion, but on each occasion one or another of the parties objected to the
assignment. Although the section 74.053 objections automatically dis-
qualified the first three assigned judges, 356 the presiding judge's fourth
assignment coincided with the administrative judge's order transferring
the case to the newly assigned judge's court. 357 Because that judge re-
garded the transfer as nullifying his simultaneous assignment to the case
as a "visiting judge," he did not disqualify himself.358
The court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of mandamus in the
case, holding that the objection to the assigned judge was effective even
though the case was ultimately transferred to that judge's court. 359 The
intermediate court thought that treating the transfer of the case as super-
seding the assignment would elevate form over substance and "circum-
vent the right to object to assignments of local elected judges. ' 360 The
supreme court disagreed, observing that section 74.053 allows objections
only to assignments made under Chapter 74.361 The administrative
judge's power to transfer the case in Houston Lighting, on the other
hand, derived from state and local procedural rules.362 The high court
352. See id.
353. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon 1998).
354. See id.
355. 976 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
356. See id. at 671.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See In re City of Wharton, 966 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. App.-Houston, orig. pro-
ceeding), overruled sub nom., In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 976 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.
1998).
360. Id. at 858 n.10.
361. See Houston Lighting, 976 S.W.2d at 672. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.053(a)
(Vernon 1998) (providing for objection "[w]hen a judge is assigned under this Chapter").
362. See Houston Lighting, 976 S.W.2d at 672-73 n.9; (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 330(e);
Harris (Tex.) Civ. DisT. CT. Loc. R. 3.2.5 "Any case may be transferred from one court to
another court by written order of the Administrative Judge of the Civil Trial Division...).
Both the government code and the Texas Constitution likewise authorize district courts
within the same county to transfer cases and exchange benches. TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 11;
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.303, § 74.093 (Vernon 1988).
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also noted that "[t]he policy concerns 363 reflected in the section 74.053
right to object to assigned visiting judges are not an issue in transfers
between district courts within the same county. '364
Two cases during the Survey period involved a party's motion to recuse
a trial judge who was concurrently represented by the adverse party's
attorney. In Lueg v. Lueg,3 6 5 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals af-
firmed the denial of the motion to recuse, but primarily because of defi-
ciencies in the record. 366 In this connection, the court acknowledged that
an attorney-client relationship between the judge and counsel for a party
could cause the judge's impartiality to reasonably be questioned, even
though Rule 18b(2) 367 does not overtly address that type of relation-
ship.368 Therefore, the court concluded that the attorney-client relation-
ship between the judge and opposing counsel provided a prima facie basis
for recusal.369 At the same time, however, the court observed that the
nature of the relationship might be sufficiently attenuated that it would
raise no questions about impartiality. 370 By way of example, the court
pointed out that the attorney could be representing the judge only as the
nominal party in a mandamus proceeding or as a member of a large class
of plaintiffs in a class action. 371 Because the record of the recusal hearing
was devoid of evidence as to the specific nature of the attorney's repre-
sentation of the trial judge, the appellate court decided it had no basis for
concluding that recusal was mandated. 372
The Texas Supreme Court confronted the same issue in In re Union
Pacific Resources Co. 373 In that case, unlike Lueg, the court of appeals
conditionally granted a writ of mandamus compelling the recusal of a trial
judge who was being represented by defendants' counsel.374 Expressing
no opinion on the merits of the recusal motion, the supreme court condi-
tionally granted a writ of mandamus and directed the court of appeals to
withdraw its order.375 Citing Rule 18a,376 the supreme court held that
363. According to the court, "the Legislature created the § 74.053 right to address 'the
perceived abuse of the assignment system' and to further a party's interest in having their
case heard by a locally elected or retired judge that had 'met the test of time with the
voters."' Houston Lighting, 976 S.W.2d at 673.
364. Id.
365. 976 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
366. See id. at 311.
367. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) (providing that "[a] judge shall recuse himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").





373. 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998).
374. See Monroe v. Blackmon, 946 S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997,
orig. proceeding), overruled sub nom., In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427
(Tex. 1998).
375. See In re Union Pacific, 969 S.W.2d at 429.
376. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(f) (providing that an order denying a motion to recuse or




mandamus was inappropriate in these circumstances because the com-
plaining party had an adequate remedy by appeal. 377 The court distin-
guished cases involving disqualification of a trial judge on constitutional
grounds and those in which a party exercises a statutory strike.378 In each
of those situations, disqualification is mandatory and any orders or judg-
ments entered by the disqualified judge are void and without effect. 379 In
contrast, the erroneous denial of a Rule 18a recusal motion does not void
or nullify the trial court's subsequent acts.380 Although a judgment ren-
dered in such circumstances may be reversed on appeal, it is not funda-
mental error and can be waived. 381
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. CONSOLIDATION
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the question of whether, and how
many, mass tort cases may be consolidated for trial in In re Ethyl Corp.382
and In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Corp.3 8 3 The court noted that trial judges
should proceed with "extreme caution" in consolidating claims before the
particular type of mass tort litigation is "mature," i.e., where there has
been full discovery and multiple jury verdicts in cases of that type.384 For
those mass torts where consolidation may be appropriate, the court then
articulated a number of factors, known as the Maryland factors,385 which
the trial court should analyze to determine the extent to which the fac-
tual, legal, and procedural aspects of the cases lend themselves to
consolidation. 386
B. TIMELINESS OF FILINGS
Two cases from the Fort Worth court of appeals during the Survey pe-
riod rejected lawyers' efforts to extend their time for filing papers. In
Boone v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,387 the court interpreted a
statutory provision virtually identical to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
4,388 which enlarges a party's time to take some action if the last day of
the prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 389
Although the court was willing to assume that an all-day closing of the
377. See In re Union Pacific, 969 S.W.2d at 429.
378. See id. at 428; see generally TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. Gov'r CODE
§ 74.053(d) (Vernon 1998).
379. See In re Union Pacific, 969 S.W.2d at 428.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. 975 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1998).
383. 975 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1998).
384. See Bristol-Myers, 975 S.W.2d at 603.
385. See Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d at 611 (noting that the factors were first articulated in
an unreported federal district court opinion from Maryland).
386. See id.; see also Bristol-Myers, 975 S.W.2d at 603.
387. 968 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
388. TEx. R. Civ. P. 4.
389. See id.; see also Boone, 968 S.W.2d at 469.
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courthouse for inclement weather would qualify as a legal holiday for
purposes of Rule 4, it refused to hold that a two-hour delay in the open-
ing of the courthouse qualified as such.390 In Commercial Services of
Perry, Inc. v. Wooldridge,391 the appellant sought to avail itself of the pro-
visions of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5392 which allows for extensions
of time where good cause is shown. 393 Relying on the supreme court's
standard of good cause in the discovery supplementation area, rather
than the standard applied to motions to withdraw deemed admissions, the
court held that inadvertence of counsel did not constitute good cause
within the meaning of Rule 5.394
C. SANCriONS
In re Bennett395 stands for the proposition that the "state courts retain
jurisdiction after removal of a case to federal court to sanction lawyers
for pre-removal conduct so long as the sanction does not operate upon
the merits of the underlying action. '396 The supreme court reasoned that
this result was required if the abusive conduct were to be punished, since
the federal courts have no authority to impose sanctions for pre-removal
conduct.397 On the other hand, Karagounis v. Property Co. of America398
serves as a reminder that Rule 13399 governs only the signing and filing of
frivolous pleadings; thus, sanctions can not be imposed where the plaintiff
is accused not of initiating a frivolous action, but of continuing his suit
after the defendant has provided evidence that allegedly rebuts his
contentions.400
Rule 13 requires a trial court to state with particularity in a sanctions
order the good cause for finding that the pleadings in question are
groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment. 401
The court in Gorman v. Gorman40 2 noted that the intermediate appellate
courts are divided on the issues of whether a lack of particularity in a
sanctions order may constitute harmless error and whether findings of
fact and conclusions of law may satisfy the particularity requirement.403
The Gorman court followed what it described as the majority position in
holding that a lack of particularity in the sanctions order can be harmless
390. See Boone, 968 S.W.2d at 470.
391. 968 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.h.).
392. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
393. See id.; see also Wooldridge, 968 S.W.2d at 563.
394. See id. (citing Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992)); See
also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Deggs, 968 S.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Tex. 1998).
395. 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 66 (1998).
396. Id. at 40.
397. See id. (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965, 968 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990), afjd,
503 U.S. 131 (1992)).
398. 970 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
399. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
400. See Karagounis, 970 S.W.2d at 765.
401. TEX. R. Crv. P. 13.
402. 966 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
403. Id. at 867 & n.4 (citing cases).
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error where the trial court's findings and conclusions include the particu-
lars of good cause. 40 4
D. CONTEMPT
The supreme court addressed the interplay between contempt and ap-
pellate proceedings in In re Gabbai405 and In re Long.416 In the former
case, the trial court cited a party for violating both its own decree and an
order of the court of appeals.40 7 The supreme court noted that a court
generally lacks authority to enforce another court's order of contempt.40 8
And even if, under some circumstances, a trial court should be able to
enforce appellate court orders following issuance of the mandate, a ques-
tion the supreme court declined to decide, the court of appeals in Gabbai
had already specified that the punishment for violation of its order would
be dismissal of the appeal.40 9 Under these facts, the trial court had no
authority to further punish the party for violating the appellate order.410
In Long, the trial court held the district clerk in contempt for violating an
injunction order.41 1 However, because the district clerk had appealed,
and the injunction was superseded during the pendency of that appeal,
the district clerk should not have been cited for contempt until all appeals
were exhausted and a mandate to enforce judgment was issued. 412
E. ARBITRATION AND ADR
Reversing a decision discussed in the 1998 Annual Survey,413 the
supreme court held that "absent a contrary agreement, a party against
whom a claim is asserted does not waive its right to arbitrate by failing to
initiate arbitration of that claim. ' 414 The court noted that it would be
anomalous to require the defending party, even if it has successfully
urged a court to compel arbitration, to present its opponent's case and
pay a filing fee based on the size of the opponent's claim.415 The high
court also held in In re Louisiana Pacific Corp.416 that, in a case where
each party was contractually entitled to select its own arbitrator, the trial
court should have allowed one of the parties to select a substitute arbitra-
tor after it had withdrawn its initial choice in response to the opposing
404. Id. at 867-68.
405. 968 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1998).
406. 984 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1999).
407. See Gabbai, 968 S.W.2d at 930.
408. See id. at 931.
409. Id.
410. See id.
411. Long, 42 TEX. SuP. CT. J. at 315.
412. See id. at 317.
413. See Bruce Terminix Co. v. Carroll, 953 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997) (dis-
cussed in 1998 Annual Survey at 1415), mand. granted, 41 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 941, 1998 WL
288930 (June 5, 1998).
414. In re Bruce Terminix Co., 41 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 941, 1998 WL 288930, at *3 (June 5,
1998).
415. See id.
416. 972 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. 1998).
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party's objection. 4 17
Two decisions during the Survey period reflect a split of authority on
the question of whether a trial court is authorized to address issues of
procedural prerequisites to arbitration, such as whether proper notice has
been provided. The court in L&L Kempwood Associates, L.P. v. Omega
Builders, Inc. 418 held that the notice of arbitration provision in the con-
tract at issue constituted a condition precedent, which, if it was not met,
negated the existence of any agreement to arbitrate. 419 Thus, the trial
court had the authority to address the notice issue.420 The court in In re
Gardner Zemke Co.421 reached the opposite conclusion, holding that a
"trial court is not authorized to address questions of procedural arbitrar-
ily such as the satisfaction of conditions precedent to a right of arbitra-
tion. 422 According to the Gardner Zemke court, once a party establishes
that an agreement to arbitrate exists, these type of procedural questions
should be left to the arbitrator.423
Finally, the court in Texas Department of Transportation v. Pirtle424
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing costs,
including attorneys' and mediator's fees, against a party upon finding that
it failed to mediate in good faith.425 The court distinguished Decker v.
Lindsay426 because, unlike that case, the recalcitrant party in Pirtle did
not file a written objection to the mediation order. 427
417. Id. at 65.
418. 972 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. filed).
419. Id. at 823.
420. See id. at 825.
421. 978 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1998, no pet.h.).
422. Id. at 627.
423. Id.
424. 977 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1998, pet. denied).
425. Id. at 658.
426. 824 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
427. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 658.
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